WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM SOMALIA

Y 4. F 76/1: SO 5/5

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From Soma...

MARKUP

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H. Con Res. 170

Directing the President Pursuant To Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to Remove U.S. Armed Forces From Somalia by January 31, 1994

NOVEMBER 3, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

MAR 30 1994

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WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM SOMALIA

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:40 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman) presiding.

Chairman HAMILTON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Gilman introduced H. Con. Res. 170 on October 22 of this year. It directs the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994.

Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution states that any time U.S. Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities abroad without specific statutory authorization, such forces must be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

Under section 7 of the War Powers Resolution, concurrent resolutions introduced under section 5(c) are referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and one such resolution must be reported out with recommendations by the committee within 15 calendar days. In practical terms, the committee must consider such a concurrent resolution today.

There are many views of course on the constitutionality of various aspects of the War Powers Resolution. Since the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in *INS vs. Chadha,* it is highly likely that section 5(c) would be held to be unconstitutional by any Federal court presented with that narrow question.

Despite these genuine constitutionality questions, I believe that the committee should act on the expedited procedural terms detailed in section 7 simply because individual Members of Congress probably should not make unilateral judgments about the constitutionality of provisions of law.

For this reason, the committee is meeting today to act on Mr. Gilman's resolution, H. Con. Res. 170, which the chief of staff will report.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. "H. Con. Res. 170 directing the President pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States armed forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994. Resolved by the House of Representatives, the Senate concurring, Section 1, finding that the United States armed forces in Somalia are engaged in hostilities. For purposes of Sections 5(c) and 7 of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S. Code 1544(c) and 1546, the Congress

finds that the United States armed forces in Somalia are engaged in hostilities without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization."

[The entire text of the resolution follows:]

103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. CON. RES. 170

Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 22, 1993

Mr. GILMAN (for himself and Mr. SPENCE) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994.

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. FINDING THAT THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN SOMALIA ARE ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES.

For purposes of sections 5(c) and 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c) and 1546), the Congress finds that the United States Armed Forces in Somalia are engaged in hostilities without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization.

SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF ARMED FORCES FROM SOMALIA.

Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), the Congress hereby directs the President to remove the United States Armed Forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994.

Chairman HAMILTON. The Chair recognizes Mr. Gilman for 5 minutes in support of his resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your prompt scheduling of this mark-up. I think it is time that the committee and the House reasserted itself in the formulation of our Nation's policies in Somalia. I am certain that all members of the committee have shared our frustration as we sat on the sidelines over the last several months while the Senate and the administration negotiated the terms of further U.S. involvement in Somalia.

It is in order to allow this committee and the full House to have a meaningful debate on this important issue that, along with the distinguished Ranking Republican Member, the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spence, I introduced this resolution that we are marking up today.

H. Con. Res. 170 is a concurrent resolution pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution and it directs the President to withdraw our armed forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the memorandum you circulated yesterday in which you drew the attention of members to the fact that a literal reading of section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution likely would be held unconstitutional by any Federal court called on to decide that narrow question. This means that if we pass this concurrent resolution, the effect will be the same as the effects of passing any other concurrent resolution expressing the opinion of the Congress, but having no binding legal effect on the President.

Some members have asked why I am offering the resolution if it will not have any binding legal effect. The reason is that it was the only way to ensure that the committee and the House would be able to fully debate the issue of Somalia and I would prefer for us to vote on a measure that would have had binding legal effect.

In fact, Mr. Spence and I introduced such a measure, H.R. 3292, that was essentially the same as the Byrd amendment to the fiscal year 1994 defense appropriations bill adopted by the Senate some 3 weeks ago. The main difference between our bill and the Byrd amendment was that ours moved up the date for withdrawal of our troops from March 31, 1994 to January 31.

It was made clear however that H.R. 3292 wasn't going to be scheduled for action. Our only recourse therefore was to offer this nonbinding resolution.

Some of our members have also questioned whether it is wise for Congress to tie the President's hands by setting a firm date for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. I am very sympathetic to that concern and I would point out, however, that the Byrd amendment will cutoff funds from U.S. combat troops in Somalia after March 31.

The Byrd amendment almost certainly will become law. The Senate has passed it. The administration doesn't object to it, and the House has instructed its conferees to recede to it.

The Byrd amendment is a far more serious restriction on the President's flexibility than our H. Con. Res. 170, which will not legally bind the President. Members concerned about tying the President's hands should find it much easier to vote for our resolution than for the Byrd amendment.

Because the Byrd amendment sets a deadline enforced by a funding cutoff for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia, there no longer is any question about whether Congress will set a deadline. The question before us today is what that deadline should be.

The Byrd amendment sets a deadline, as I indicated, of March 31. My concurrent resolution sets a deadline 2 months earlier, January 31.

Any question in my mind about the wisdom of getting our forces out of Somalia before March 31 was settled I think by the article in Monday's *Washington Post* about what the U.S. forces in Somalia are now engaged in and I ask that it be included in the record.

Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The article, reprinted with the permission of the Washington Post ©1993, follows:]

GIs in Somalia Dig, Duck and Cover

Mean Streets Get Meaner as U.S. Military Avoids Conflict

By John Lancaster
Washington Post Staff Writer

MOGADISHU, Somalia, Oct. 31—On the mean streets of this divided capital, the nearly completed buildup of American combat forces in Somalia is starting to seem more irrelevant than daring.

U.S. combat troops—3,600 Army soldiers backed by the same number of Marines on ships nearby—are all but invisible here. They do not patrol city streets or enforce the United Nations's ban on openly carried weapons and militia checkpoints.

NEWS ANALYSIS

Instead, the evolving American military strategy in Somalia might best be described as duck and cover. While gunmen rule the streets outside, American soldiers live in vast, protected enclaves linked by specially constructed bypass roads, avoiding all but occasional contact with the city they were sent to help secure. For now, at least, U.S. military commanders are focusing almost exclusively on one goal: keeping American casualties to a minimum until the planned U.S. withdrawal next March.

"You've got this huge force flying in with nothing to do but protect its perimeters and bases," said one frustrated U.S. officer. "Meanwhile, everything is going to hell in a handbasket on the outside."

There are, of course, good reasons for caution. With the forces of faction leader Mohamed Farah Aideed holding their fire against American and U.N. troops, U.S. commanders want to avoid offensive measures that could foil diplomatic efforts to broker a peace settlement among Aideed and rival clans.

On the other hand, there is no evidence that President Clinton is fulfilling his pledge to "keep open and secure the key roads and lines of communication" in Somalia and "keep the pressure on" armed looters and factional fighters.

Despite the cease-fire, security in Mogadishu has eroded in recent days, with gunmen and militia checkpoints reappearing on city streets amid renewed clashes among rival sub-clans. U.N. and American civilian officials complain privately that they now have more difficulty moving around the city than during four months of sporadic combat with Aideed's forces after the United Nations ordered the militia leader's arrest. In addition, they say, factional tensions and extortion threats are once more interfering with relief operations here.

"Checkpoints, gunmen running around town—that's got to stop," said a U.S. government official here who asked not to be named. "The city throughout the war with Aideed was functioning better than it is now. Now, you can't get across town."

The official added: "We keep building wider bypasses instead of dealing with whatever the problem is that's forcing us to build wider bypasses. It's the classic military conundrum. Are you more secure improving your fortifications or going out more aggressively and patrolling?"

The deteriorating security situation—and the absence of any U.S. military response—prompted a cable from the American diplomatic mission here to the State Department late last week expressing concern that U.S. forces have "totally pulled back," according to a U.S. official familiar with its contents.

U.S. military officers too are frustrated by what they describe as an absence of clear guidance from Washington. They are hoping to receive such guidance this week from Clinton's special envoy to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley, who arrives here Monday in a bid to jump-start stalled political negotiations among rival clans. Oakley met last week with members of the military's Joint Staff to try to clarify the U.S. military mission, a U.S. official said.

"I'd call it 'Waiting for Oakley,'" said a U.S. officer here of the posture of American forces. "I do not think that in the end events will allow us to carry out the policy as it exists right now and achieve the desired results. There will have to be choices made."

At present, the diplomatic process is stalled, with Aideed refusing to send delegates to U.N.-sponsored political talks. U.S. officials say Oakley has little chance of breaking the deadlock so long as Aideed believes he has nothing to fear from the expanded U.S. military presence here. "I suspect [Oakley] is going to give them [U.S. forces] a little more room to maneuver," as U.S. official said. "Something needs to be done."

For now, soldiers devote most of their professional energies to self-preservation—stringing barbed wire, filling sandbags and plotting defensive artillery coordinates in keeping with the "force protection" mission that U.S. commanders say is their number-one priority. Even the formidable U.S. armored contingent—30 M-1A1 tanks, 48 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and eight self-propelled howitzers—will for now be parked at a remote base being bulldozed out of an old surface-to-air missile site several miles outside the city.

The U.S. decision to dig in rather than move out also has affected the posture of multinational U.N. peacekeeping troops. These troops were supposed to serve as the front-line enforcers of security in Mogadishu, with the American soldiers standing by for emergencies. But the arrival of the American reinforcements has done little to boost the confidence of their U.N. partners, who remain largely confined to 11 U.N. strongholds around the city.

In keeping with their non-confrontational approach, American and U.N. military commanders sought to negotiate with representatives of Aideed's political organization, the Somali National Alliance, after members of his militia began brandishing weapons in full view of several Pakistani strongpoints last week. But when they convened a meeting Saturday of a newly formed "security advisory committee" purported to include each of the city's 15 factions and clan groups, only four representatives showed up, none from Aideed's faction.

Later in the day, American helicopters dropped leaflets over the city explaining once again the U.N. rules against the open display of weapons. But the message seemed to have eluded a jeering mob of armed Somalis who showed up today outside the hotel in Mogadishu where most foreign journalists stay after members of a rival faction held a news conference there. The latter escaped by car after firing a warning shot in the air.

American helicopter pilots who fly reconnaissance patrols over the city still report occasional gunfire in their direction, but they too are exercising extreme restraint. During a battle between Somali factions last Monday, the pilot of a U.S. helicopter spotted through his targeting camera the Somali who had just tried unsuccessfully to kill him with a rocket-propelled grenade, according to a senior officer. But the pilot elected not to return fire.

The American retreat from the streets has been accompanied by a rise in thuggery and factional violence, which once more has begun to interfere with humanitarian relief work here. Last week, the port was virtually shut down for three days after Somalis from south Mogadishu prevented rivals from the northern half of the city from reporting to their jobs as dockworkers, port officials said.

The anarchy of city streets contrasts sharply with the largely self-contained world of the adjoining U.N. and American compounds here. Behind the fortified walls are orderly rows of tents and air-conditioned trailers, volleyball courts and an Israeli-run post exchange featuring shaded outdoor seating and cold, canned beer.

Mr. GILMAN. To give members a flavor of that article, please allow me to read from it: "The nearly completed buildup of American combat forces in Somalia is starting to seem more irrelevant than daring. U.S. combat troops are all but invisible here. The evolving military strategy in Somalia might best be described as duck and cover. While gunmen rule the streets outside, our American soldiers live in vast protected enclaves linked by specially constructed bypass roads, avoiding all but occasional contact with a city they were sent to help secure. U.S. military commanders are focusing almost exclusively on one goal and that is keeping American casualties to a minimum until the planned U.S. withdrawal next March."

Let's face it, my colleagues, the U.S. mission in Somalia has changed from saving lives to saving face. I have always avoided the debate over how many American lives we should be willing to sacrifice to alleviate suffering in Somalia. I never thought that that was a useful way to engage in a worthwhile debate. But I am prepared to state with total conviction that it is not worth one American life to help the authors of a failed policy save face.

I say to my colleagues, let's bring the troops home as soon as possible, and I urge my colleague and invite them to support this resolution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HAMILTON AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

Chairman HAMILTON. The Chair has an amendment in the nature of a substitute at the desk.

The chief of staff will report the amendment.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Amendment by Mr. Hamilton to H. Con. Res. 170: "Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following: Section 1, Removal of"——

Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, further reading of the amendment is dispensed with, printed in the record in full and open for amendment.

[The amendment follows:]

AMENDMENT TO H.CON. RES. 170
OFFERED BY MR. HAMILTON

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM SOMALIA.

Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), the Congress hereby directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from Somalia by March 31, 1994 (unless the President requests and the Congress authorizes a later date), except for a limited number of members of the Armed Forces sufficient only to protect United States diplomatic facilities and citizens, and noncombatant personnel to advise the United Nations commander in Somalia.

[The title of the resolution should be amended to read as follows: "Concurrent resolution directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from Somalia.".]

The Chair recognizes himself in support of the substitute.

I think it is clear to everybody the difference between the proposal by Mr. Gilman and the amendment in the nature of a substitute that I offer.

Under my substitute, the Congress directs the President to remove U.S. troops from Somalia by March 31. Mr. Gilman, of course, has a withdrawal date of January 31. The amendment that I have offered very closely tracks the Somalia amendment to the Senate defense appropriations bill which provided for the March 31 date, with a limited exception under which a small number of U.S. forces may remain beyond March 31.

Now, I do think it is important for members to recognize here what concurrent resolution language does. Given the Supreme Court decision, the *Chadha* case that I referred to earlier, it is not likely that any court would find such a concurrent resolution which the President does not sign binding upon the President.

The legal advisor for the administration can speak to that, but my sense is that the administration would not find this binding. So the legal standing of the resolution is murky at best.

I think we should focus on the policy questions that Mr. Gilman has raised. It really comes down to one question, and that is, why shouldn't the troops be brought back earlier than the March 31 deadline that the President has designated? A few comments on that.

First I think we need to give the negotiating process in Somalia a reasonable chance of success. The presence of the U.S. forces is the main element preventing a return to anarchy in Somalia. Ambassador Oakley is on the scene. He is making progress. He has reported back to many of us that progress is being made, and we do not want to undercut him at this delicate point in the negotiations. You do undercut him if you move up the date for the American troop withdrawal.

If these negotiations do not succeed, we know that the result will be almost certainly a return to anarchy that prevailed prior to December of 1992. So the President's deadline of March 31 gives us a reasonable chance. It also gives the United Nations a reasonable chance to put their act together, a reasonable period of time to secure the participation of other member nations' forces to replace U.S. troops.

An active effort is being made right now to do that very thing. Progress is being made there as well. My colleagues will recall that the President made a commitment in October to give the United Nations 6 months to buildup the United Nations force there, and I think the Gilman resolution would undermine that effort very substantially and would make it impossible for the United Nations to put into place a force that could take the place of the American forces.

Another point with regard to my amendment is that it permits the United States, while the U.S. military is there, to continue to play a key role in the provision of humanitarian assistance throughout the country. We are now protecting the port. Our forces accompany convoys. If we withdraw those forces, the ability of the United Nations relief organizations to help these people is doubtful.

Clearly they have a better chance if they stay until March 31. If we pull the plug now, the outcome will be starvation, not tomorrow, but the old problems will almost certainly come back if there is no security for humanitarian relief.

We had an extensive discussion in this country with regard to when our troops should come out. The President made a judgment here. He set a policy. That policy is a policy of disengagement. For those who have argued that we had to get out of Somalia, you can declare victory here.

Let's not get into a major foreign policy dispute with the President over 60 days. If that is not micromanagement, I don't know what is.

The President has said March 31 we will be out of there. The Senate has agreed to that position by a 3-to-1 vote. Senator Dole supports it. Many Republicans supported that position. The Democrats supported it. It is a solid, bipartisan position in the Senate. If we come along now and try to undermine it, the signal goes out throughout the world that the United States cannot get its act together. We cannot follow the leadership of the President of the United States on a foreign policy issue, and we are going to argue about 60 days.

What a signal that is to the world, that the United States cannot agree on a foreign policy and we argue over 60 days. I don't think that is the signal we want to send out. You may not be entirely satisfied with the March 31 date. Any of us could pick a different date. The fact of the matter is the date is set, we are going to be out of there March 31.

We think we can accomplish things between now and March 31. Give us a chance to do so. We don't know whether we can accomplish all our goals, but we think we have a reasonable shot at it. Let's not undercut the President. Let's not undercut the Senate.

I think the Senate agreement and the President's position now reflects public opinion. A recent poll showed that 28 percent of the American people supported an immediate withdrawal from Somalia; 48 percent favored the March 31 deadline; 27 percent favored staying longer.

So I urge members to support the amendment in the nature of a substitute that I have offered, and by doing so, support the President and the position the Senate has taken. You create a united position for the United States, and not undercut the stated U.S. policy.

I urge members to think about the consequences of the Gilman resolution for the credibility of the President in conducting American foreign policy, the credibility of the Senate for that matter, although we don't usually worry too much about that.

I urge you to vote for my substitute.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment.

Chairman HAMILTON. The Clerk will report the amendment.

I am informed, Mr. Goodling, at this point your amendment as written is not in order because it amends Mr. Gilman's resolution and not my substitute, so we will have to deal with the substitute first.

Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With respect to your substitute, Mr. Chairman, you were very eloquent by your——

Chairman HAMILTON. But not persuasive, is that it?

Mr. ROTH. I was persuaded until I read the statement of our Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher, who, as you recall yesterday in Los Angeles gave a speech calling for a national debate on Somalia. This was the report on the wire service today. He called Somalia a failed state.

Well, Secretary Christopher, we have been debating Somalia for 11 months. Where have you been? If the Secretary admits that Somalia is a failed state, then let everyone recognize that the United States in Somalia is a failed policy.

Last April the Secretary set out four conditions for use of American troops. What were they? A clear mission, a reasonable chance for success, support of the American people, and fourth, a plan for ending the mission and withdrawing.

On all four counts, Mr. Chairman, the use of troops in Somalia violates the Secretary's own criteria. There is no mission. There is no chance for success. The American people want the troops out and Mr. Gilman is right, there is no clear ending to this fiasco. Therefore, the Gilman initiative is not only praiseworthy; we have to take that initiative.

Now in the face of the administration's confusion, indecision and failure, it is time for Congress to act. After all, the Constitution says there is a separation of powers that we have an obligation and that we have abdicated, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, our constitutional duties.

When we went into Somalia last December, we had a clear, specific mission to relieve the famine. But last spring our policy in Somalia changed to an open-ended impossible goal of recreating Somalia's economy, government and society. In short, we have seen this administration snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in Somalia.

Last spring some of us saw disaster coming. On May 25, the House voted on an amendment that I had to bring our troops home within 30 days. The amendment got 127 votes in the House. How much pain, suffering and casualties would we have prevented had Congress pulled out our troops by June 30 as 127 of us urged?

In the wake of the Mogadishu massacre, the President said he wants to bring most of our troops home by the end of March, another 5 months. But 5 months is too long a time. We have heard these promises before.

Everyone should note that the chairman's substitute amendment would allow some troops to stay in Somalia beyond March 31. That is the problem. Unless we set a date and get our troops out, we will never see the end of this mess.

The truth is, our troops should have been home months ago. Today, however, we have another opportunity to act and to save our troops from further disaster. Who knows—10,000 American soldiers we have committed in Somalia today with no mission, no hope of affecting events in that country—is this being fair to our troops in uniform?

There is no reason to leave them in that danger zone for another 5 months. Can anyone of the other side come up with any reason why our troops should sit in Somalia with no mission?

Mr. Gilman, you are right. There is no mission other than to cover the President's political retreat. So the issue here today is whether the Congress will step in and finally call a halt to this confused and failed adventure.

The War Powers Resolution was written 20 years ago this month for exactly these circumstances: when a President keeps American troops in a war zone against the will of the American people.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to differ. The American people wants our troops out. I would hope that we would vote for the Gilman resolution and with deference to our chairman ask him to join in supporting the Gilman resolution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Lantos and then Mrs. Meyers.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To quite an extent, I will direct my remarks to my Republican friends because they know that there is probably no one more bipartisan in his approach to foreign policy than I have been through the years.

On the Gulf War Resolution, I stood against the Speaker, the Majority Leader, the Majority Whip, and the distinguished chairman of this committee in supporting President Bush, and I would like to approach this issue with the same degree of bipartisanship.

I must admit as an American I am appalled at listening to an uncertain trumpet from my good friend Mr. Gilman of New York. It is humiliating for the United States yet again to go through this meaningless and vacillating debate.

We have had this debate. A great power cannot change its mind every 3 weeks. The Senate voted 2 weeks ago, 76 to 23, and such irresponsible ultra liberals as Danforth and Domenici and Dole and Hatch and Warner have all agreed with the President of the United States and with the Democratic majority that there has to be a reasonable length of time for us to attempt to turn over to other nations within the United Nations this responsibility.

If you vote for this resolution, you are going way beyond Somalia. Somalia is not the issue. The issue is the signals that this nation sends out as we deal with the most important foreign policy matter of the post-cold war era, how do we build collective security?

You don't build collective security every few weeks adding a new vote and a new debate. Mr. Gilman asks how many American lives is it worth to stay there? In my book, not one. But I am old enough to remember, as are you, Mr. Gilman, that in single battles in the Second World War, tens of thousands of people died. It is snake oil. It is sickening snake oil to peddle a world of no risk and no costs.

I know there are people who would like to say "Stop the world. I want to get off." That is not the world we live in, and if the United States, the backbone of this mission now, pulls out, which of course we won't, this will have no impact except to diminish the stature of the United States in the eyes of our own people and in the eyes of the world.

As the chairman stated, This will not be effective. This is just a rhetorical exercise. This is not for real. This is just to make some political point, and you know it, Mr. Gilman and Mr. Roth.

The fact is that American troops will pull out on March 31. This uncertain trumpet must not be sounded. This must be soundly defeated. We are dealing with a principle of the one remaining superpower committed to democracy and freedom not knowing from week to week what it will do.

I strongly urge the defeat of the Gilman proposal and support of the Hamilton motion.

Chairman HAMILTON. I have Mrs. Meyers, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Johnston, and then Mr. Manzullo.

Mrs. Meyers is recognized.

Mrs. MEYERS. Mr. Chairman, I support Mr. Gilman's resolution and I think it is past time to leave Somalia. I supported the humanitarian mission to help feed starving people, but I don't think it was ever our place to try to put that country back together.

I believe the January 31 deadline is much more appropriate. The President said in his October 13 report to Congress that the United States military mission in Somalia is to assist in providing a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian relief. But, Mr. Chairman, American forces in Somalia are not doing anything more now than just defending their compounds.

There is no real reason why our troops should stay there for the additional 2 months serving as targets. The Secretary of State yesterday called Somalia a failed state and said that it was possibly beyond the reach of American democracy. If that is the case, why should the American troops provide a presence in that country for any longer than it takes to safely withdraw them?

Certainly I think all of us would want to allow time for other countries' forces and the United Nations to make the necessary adjustments. The President has agreed that American forces must be withdrawn from Somalia. How is it in our national security interest to keep them there for an additional 60 days? The President has not given an adequate answer to that question.

I strongly support the Gilman resolution, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that March is the proper date to withdraw our troops, but I am talking about March of 1993. I have been calling publicly for the withdrawal of American troops since March of 1993, and on the floor repeatedly since May of 1993.

The mission, clearly defined humanitarian missions for which these troops were sent to Somalia were completed. It was time to follow the late George Akins' advice and declare victory and bring them home. But they weren't.

This is more than about political points and the scoring thereof. This is a matter of having our mission completed, our troops remaining there for no good reason, and the need to bring them home.

I think it was an outrageous dereliction of responsibility in the top civilian levels of the Pentagon which permitted our personnel to be placed in a position where they were. They were placed with-

out necessary support to defend themselves to accomplish their mission.

I feel that way. My constituents feel that way. I believe that most Americans feel that way. Most importantly, rather than associating blame in any particular direction, however, they want to cut our losses since we have accomplished our mission and get them out of there.

The status of our forces in Somalia is not about scoring political points. It is about the House being thwarted from its opportunity to discuss and debate this matter fully by the leadership of this house. We didn't have the opportunity they had in the other body, not a free and open debate where amendments could be offered. We should have had and still should have the kind of open debate that took place before the United States engaged its forces in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

That was good for the country. It was good for the Congress to go through that process. It gave us the kind of unity that we needed to have behind our men and women who were engaged in Desert Shield and then Desert Storm.

The best opportunity we have to force that kind of debate today is by supporting the Gilman amendment, and it is also the way we are likely to get our troops out of harm's way when they have already completed their mission at the earliest possible time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. The Chair has been informed that they expect votes on the House floor about 5 o'clock tonight. I hope we can wind up by that time.

Mr. Johnston.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me remind my colleagues that on January 20 of this year when President Clinton was sworn in, there were 28,000 troops put into Somalia with no debate prior to that time.

My good friend, Mr. Bereuter, there was no debate on Desert Shield. On Desert Storm, there were half a million troops there before the debate even started.

I am a little disappointed in the ranking member because of his reputation for bipartisanship, for vision and for where the United States should be in the international community in a post-cold war era. There are serious, serious consequences that can happen—the fact that this resolution will ever be passed because I think it is being put out there in order to embarrass the administration and also embarrass the Republican leadership.

We know that this will not become law and will not be passed, so I am a little disappointed. Somalia is the test case here. If we fail there, you will never see us go in again.

I have made the prediction that if there were starvation in the Bahamas now, the American public as such because of what has happened in this body in the last 6 months, and because everyone wants to have a big debate on isolationism here, that the United States is going to go back and build a fence around itself and not have any humanitarian effort at all in the rest of the world here.

I don't know where the rhetoric was, though, when we invaded Grenada. We had combat there for 5 days and we lost nineteen American troops. I don't know what the American policy was then. I don't know what the American policy was without debate when

we invaded Panama; 13 days of combat, 23 deaths of American soldiers.

Does anyone in the room know how many men or women we have lost in Somalia in the last 11 months? We have had 30 deaths. We have saved 400,000 Somalians from starving to death.

I mourn the death of all 30 men and women. It is a volunteer Army. As the poet said, "Every man's death diminishes me," but by staying there and trying to get some type of civility in Somalia, we are probably going to save another 300,000 people in the next 2 months. If we pull out, everyone else pulls out and the entire operation which was started by President Bush will collapse.

President Bush—one of his motives for going in there was to stabilize the environment, and that is exactly what the troops are trying to do right now. The message, as Mr. Lantos says, that we are sending to the world I think is the wrong one. What are we going to say to the members of the Committee on Asia and Cambodia, to the members of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere to Haiti, to the members of the Committee on Europe and the Middle East dealing with Bosnia?

In Africa right now, the United States has a policy that we cannot look at Burundi where there will probably be 10,000 to 20,000 Hutus slaughtered in the next 30 days.

I am begging my colleagues that we cannot go back to the League of Nations syndrome in the 1920's. We are the only world power and we have a humanitarian mandate to try to be our brother's keeper. So I strongly urge that we vote for the chairman's substitute amendment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. I have quite a list of speakers here and I am going to ask members if they can keep their remarks to 3 minutes if possible. We would then be able to complete our business before the vote.

Mr. Manzullo.

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I supported at the beginning of this year Mr. Roth's resolution to bring the troops home by June 30. The purpose of the House Foreign Affairs Committee is to freely discuss this issue and I think this is not rhetoric for us to be involved in the formulation of policy.

We have heard it said that the administration cannot change its mind every 2 weeks. The problem is that the administration has not even fixed its mind on why we have a presence in Somalia. I am not concerned about sending a wrong signal, but about sending our troops home in boxes. I would rather see a declaimed victory than it claim another American life.

The real issue here is the abandonment of foreign policy to the United Nations. That is the issue. It is turning over the decisions that we should have been making for ourselves in Somalia to the United Nations and other Third World countries. We face the ignominious shame of our American troops having to be bailed out by Malaysian troops when our administration sent our troops into harm's way without the proper weaponry to protect them.

That is why the Gilman amendment is absolutely necessary. That is why because of the failed American policy in Somalia the

message is this: It was wrong to stay in Somalia after our mission was completed and it is right to get them back home and get them back home now.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Torricelli.

I will come back to him.

Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, some of my concerns were cleared up with the remarks that I would like to associate myself with of Congressman Johnston. First, I don't think that this amendment as offered by Mr. Gilman is likely to pass and if it did, what would be the practical effect of it.

The practical effect is absolutely nothing, for the reason that there is no way on earth before the stated time that there is going to be the kind of procedural undertaking within the framework of the House and the Senate that will allow for this policy to become the policy of the United States.

Secondly, Mr. Gilman's resolution ignores the fact that the wind down in Somalia has already begun. The administration has changed its course rather considerably, and that allows among other things for a new kind of policy which contemplates the regional states specifically—Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya—in their assistance in the particular area and three of those states have allowed that they support a continuing United States military presence.

The fact is that at some point everything has to end and it is time for us to put the divisive debate with reference to Somalia behind us and move on with the Hamilton amendment which I support and urge my colleagues to do likewise.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to make a few brief comments. One of the previous speakers mentioned Grenada. I can only say that one of the results of Grenada was a bill of impeachment against President Reagan filed by a sitting member who is now chairman of a very important committee. For all I know, it is still languishing in the files of the house.

They had a strategy. They had a well-defined mission, and it was accomplished. I have never accepted the constitutionality of the War Powers Act even when it was routinely asserted when it was waved constantly like a flag in this very chamber during the Reagan and Bush administrations. I have always thought the constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief superseded the statutory effort to abridge that.

It is interesting the double standard because now it is the law that dare not speak its name, when it was one of the most referred to, and as I say, asserted pieces of legislation extant during the Reagan-Bush years.

I also remember—and this is one of my good arguments against term limits—I remember sitting in this general area when the Commandant of the Marine Corps was questioned rather thoroughly about the incident of October 21, 1983 when 234 Marines were dispatched through circumstances which are still very murky.

We have had no hearings here. We have exercised no oversight over the failure to bring armored vehicles forward when requested by the people in the field, and we won't. But we sure had them in previous administrations.

Now this is really to save the President's face, and I don't think that is a negligible idea. I think we should speak with one voice on foreign policy and the President has spoken and the gentlemen from Mount Olympus have agreed and gone along with it. I suppose we are supposed to go along with it too because they have spoken in the other body.

But this committee, it seems to me, is approaching atrophy in matters of foreign policy. The Secretary of State has been here, as far as I can recall, once this year since the new administration came in, and that was last May. I know he is coming Friday to talk about NAFTA, but we have many, many matters in foreign policy, Haiti, Somalia and others that we ought to be able to talk about here, and this body ought to be able to debate what is going on, Bosnia-Hercegovina.

We are not served by simply dismissing the Somalia situation, which has cost us lives and has cost us creditability simply by deferring to the other body. That is the purpose of Mr. Gilman's amendment here, his initiative; so this body can divest itself of the dust of lethargy and take a meaningful place in the debate that must go on as to which direction and where our foreign policy and our military policy is going.

There are many questions. How do you eviscerate the military while giving it more and more assignments around the world in the far-flown reaches of the globe? What is assertive multilateralism and what is our role in it?

North Korea—there are lots of things going on in this world, Mr. Chairman, and this is the place to talk about them.

I will support Mr. Gilman. I do so reluctantly because I don't like to undercut the President, and 60 days is not all that important. But to coin a phrase, we should not be potted plants in this committee, and this at least gives us a chance to stand up and say you can't do that any more. Bring our boys home.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I thought you were eloquent, dramatic, persuasive—more so than I have heard in the 18 or 19 years that we have served together, but not quite persuasive enough to talk me out of offering my "home-by-Christmas" amendment.

I do this differently than I think the discussion has been presented today. I am not interested in blaming the former President, the present President or the next President. What I think we are missing in this committee and perhaps in the Congress of the United States is the very subtle change that has been taking place in the United Nations, and that is what scares me to death.

We had a mission. We did it well. We were very well received. It wasn't until we turned the forces over to United Nations command that they changed their policy. Peacekeeping isn't sexy enough any more, in my estimation. I believe their mission is nation-building. But they can't build nations with or without our help.

I am afraid that is the direction in which we are going and we in this body and in the Congress of the United States better be looking very, very carefully at the direction the United Nations is moving and make sure that we don't get caught up in this whole movement, because as I said before, they can't build nations with us; they can't build nations without us.

That should not be the direction they are going, but it is the direction I fear they are moving every day. That is why I have a concern that we speak up because I don't want us to become pawns in the hands of the United Nations. As soon as the troops came under United Nations control, most of the mandates that come from the United Nations are pretty fuzzy. Therefore, the commander on the ground nine times out of ten has to make decisions. What is it that he is supposed to do?

If we are going to make a decision to deploy our forces, then I would like our commanders to be there and I would like our forces to be protected. If we are going to chase warlords, then they better have the best protection possible.

I am coming from a totally different view than anything I have heard here and it is my concern that we are moving in the United Nations from peacekeeping to nation-building and I believe we will be sorry down the road if we follow along this line.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, first I would like to compliment Mr. Gilman for his initiative that has made this debate possible; and second, thank you, Mr. Chairman for the tone that you have set for this discussion.

There are few issues that come before this committee or indeed before the Congress that have greater import than the question of the deployment of American forces and the risk to American lives. Any of us who have served in the Congress can look back over the years and find moments and votes of regret.

For me there have been none greater than those few instances where now I can see that because of loyalty to another member, deference to a President, I sometimes put my better judgment aside and approved of the deployment of American forces, only to find a loss of life.

In the case of Lebanon, for as long as most of us may serve in this Congress, that will always be the time when our best judgments were used the least. That will never leave us.

I have not reached a final judgment in my own mind. I was waiting for this discussion today. But there are some arguments that were made that I want to address that I do not think should be part of this discussion.

First, the notion that the credibility of the United States is at issue on whether or not we stay in Somalia another 60 days to me begs the absurd. This country having defeated Saddam Hussein in days, raising a great international coalition, now still in the shadow of an enormous victory in the cold war, the idea that our credibility is at issue in Mogadishu simply should not be the balance in anyone's mind here today; or indeed that a signal would be sent.

What we finally do here today and whether or not we remain in Somalia for another 60 days is going to be little remembered by

anyone around the world or even in this institution. But who will remember this is if, because of false pride or a signal, we perceive some mother or father the rest of their lives is remembering that a son or daughter was lost—to me, Mr. Chairman, this issue is finally resolved in whether or not there is an identifiable national interest, and something substantive that is going to be achieved in the identifiable 60 days.

An identifiable national interest is simply in my mind whether the continuation of the United Nations mission can be achieved by this brief extension of a period of time and there is sufficient and there are identifiable Somali lives that can be protected from famine.

Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, but if you would permit me for a moment with a representative of the State Department and the Department of Defense for a brief question or two?

Chairman HAMILTON. Representatives of State and Defense, step forward please.

Identify yourself.

Ms. SHERMAN. I am Wendy Sherman, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs. With me is Ambassador David Shinn, who is the Director of the Somalia Coordination Staff; and Tom Longstreth, Director of the Somalia Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, the extension of this additional 60 days, if granted I probably speak for more members than myself in wanting to know whether this will result in some substantive achievement that is worth the additional risk to American lives.

Would you assess for us the chances that if this extension is given, that the United Nations will succeed in finding other forces that will replace the Americans who are departing or whether we are simply going to find our positions left vacant if either date is adopted?

Ms. SHERMAN. I will answer in general terms.

The President at the request of the United States Congress—and I want to actually affirm this committee and the House, because indeed it was this committee which held the markup on this portion of Somalia and in fact took a resolution to the floor—had a floor debate and passed on May 25 a 1-year program in terms of the President's policy focus in Somalia.

So we think that the House Foreign Affairs Committee has been very actively involved in the Somalia debate and we welcome this discussion today.

There are three things that we are trying to accomplish with the additional troops. One is to get others to share the burden, and indeed Pakistan and Egypt are both sending additional troops.

Mr. TORRICELLI. When are those troops arriving?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I think we are already seeing some progress in obtaining commitments of other countries to send additional troops. The Nepalese sent a contingency of forces that has recently arrived. The Egyptians have a second battalion en route and a third battalion that is preparing to depart, and the Pakistanis have informally committed to provide——

Mr. TORRICELLI. Do you believe during this extension of 60 days that the American positions will be assumed by these Pakistani or Egyptian forces?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Let me make three points in response to your question on the 60 days. Let me make several points.

First I think we are already seeing the benefits of having U.S. forces and a reinforcement of our forces there on the ground and the commitment of the President to stay to 31 March. Ambassador Oakley is in Mogadishu right now meeting with the factions and I think indications we are seeing from his trip are positive.

Mr. TORRICELLI. This is interesting, but this doesn't answer my question. I want to know that if the members of this committee vote for an additional 60 days, there is a greater chance for termination of the 60 days that there are going to be forces to take the American positions, assure delivery of supplies that have a meaningful value in avoiding starvation in Somalia.

Are there forces that are currently being identified with a reasonable chance of success that you will assure this committee are going to take American positions if we remain?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I think there is a reasonable chance.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Pakistani and Egyptian?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I think the opposite is also the case. If we were to let the world know, let our UNOSOM partners know, that we were going to pull out prematurely, there would be no chance of getting any additional forces to take our place to see that UNOSOM completed its mission successfully.

Ms. SHERMAN. There are so far Nepalese, Egyptian and Pakistani troops identified, additional troops. There are conversations going on to identify other troops in addition to those and I think the absolute answer to your question is yes, it gives us a reasonable chance of replacing our troops with multilateral forces that in fact can assure that humanitarian needs are met.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, for a moment, for all of us who are loathe to become identified with the operation in Somalia, given the extraordinary difficulty of execution in recent weeks, one other thing remains principal in my mind. Are you convinced that the material is in place to defend these forces, the equipment that is required is available, and that they are in secure positions as required to avoid any further difficulties of the kind of magnitude we have seen in the past?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Let me state that it is my understanding that certainly the Secretary is convinced, the military commanders on the ground are convinced, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is convinced——

Mr. TORRICELLI. Are there any unmet requests for personnel or equipment that have been deemed necessary by commanders on the ground that have not been provided?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. None that I am aware of.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I found much of that reassuring. I also know the administration is sensitive to the micromanagement of this as in any policy. We simply suggest until this unfortunate chapter is behind us, I think it is warranted and I think today's discussion is helpful.

Thank you both.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. May I make one other point in response to some of the comments you have made? Let me make a logistical point here.

In light of my conversations with my military colleagues on the Joint Staff and Central Command, I think is important for the committee to understand something. Withdrawing in an orderly manner that maintains security throughout the process takes time. Mogadishu has a small airport, a small seaport, limited "throughput," as the logisticians that I deal with call it. To get all our forces out by 31 March is a challenge for our logistical support forces. It is formidable enough, but it is a doable undertaking.

To try to accelerate that to the 31st of January I think would stretch our lift resources to the limit and might not be possible.

Chairman HAMILTON. Is it also your judgment that if you try to accelerate the withdrawal, you put American lives in jeopardy?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Absolutely. What we are trying to maintain throughout this 5-month period is a situation on the ground in Mogadishu and throughout Somalia such that we could have an orderly withdrawal.

Chairman HAMILTON. I want to be clear. The military testimony is that if you withdraw the troops prior to March 31, you jeopardize the lives of Americans?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to speak for my military colleagues. They are not here. I can state unequivocally that it would be extremely difficult logistically to withdraw our forces in total by 31 January.

Chairman HAMILTON. And in doing so, you increase the risk to the lives of forces on the ground?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Any time you accelerate withdrawal plans without careful planning, you increase the risk.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I address this to you and to each of the representatives of the administration. Is it our mutual understanding, Mr. Chairman, that there are two missions that are present here and two circumstances under which these forces leave their current positions?

One is this self-defense necessary to protect the current deployment of American forces? And second, if necessary to relieve or to rescue United Nations forces in the delivery of food supplies—are those the only two missions that take us off these compounds?

Mr. Chairman, is that also your understanding from your discussions with the administration?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. That is partially correct. The mission is exactly as was laid out by the President in his report to Congress 13 October. The only two additional missions given to U.S. military forces under that policy are to secure the lines of communication so humanitarian supplies can continue to get through and to try to ensure a secure and safe situation on the ground so that the United Nations can complete its mission in Somalia.

Ms. SNOWE. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. TORRICELLI. I would be happy to yield.

Ms. SNOWE. I would like to ask you if you are talking about the interest of saving lives, which is why we have entered into this debate here today? Why then did the DOD reject the request for armored tanks?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. With all due respect, I am here today to make the case for why we should keep our forces in place in Somalia as the President has directed to the 31st of March. I was not in the chain of command during that decision, not privy to the conversations between the CINC and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and with due respect, I prefer to defer that question.

Chairman HAMILTON. We have four speakers remaining—Mr. Burton, Mr. Payne, Mr. Roth, and Mr. Gilman. I hope we can conclude debate on the amendment at that point.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From the *Washington Post*, I would like to read this: "Despite the cease-fire, security in Mogadishu has eroded in recent days with gunmen and militia checkpoints reappearing on militia city streets amid renewed clashes among rival sub-clans. U.N. and American officials complain privately that they now have more difficulty moving around the city than during the 4 months of sporadic combat with Aideed's forces after the United Nations or the militia leader's arrest.

"In addition," they say, "factional tensions and extortion threats are once more interfering with the relief operations here. Check points, gun men running around town, that has to stop, said a U.S. Government official here who would not be named. The city throughout the war with Aideed was functioning better than it is now. Now you can't go across town."

The official added, "We keep building wider bypasses instead of dealing with whatever the problem is that is forcing us to build wider bypasses. It is a classic military conundrum."

Are you more secure in improving your fortification or going out and patrolling more aggressively? The fact of the matter is that we are sitting ducks over there. One of the things that has not been discussed is that there was a meeting in Khartum some time ago and this is not top secret.

There was a meeting in Khartum involving Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans, Sudanese and Mr. Aideed at which they were talking about utilizing all or part of the 3,000 terrorists that are being trained in the Sudan in Somalia to try and undermine the U.S. position in the world and many people believe that weapons that are coming in from Iran through Sudan getting into Somalia, RPG's and Lord knows what else, and that there are terrorists there that are posing as Somalis waiting for the moment to attack our troops and many believe that they were involved in shooting down our helicopters that killed those 18 Marines and wounded 70 others.

Their purpose is to have us leave with our tail between our legs I am sure because it will enhance their position in the Middle East where about 70 percent of our oil supplies come from. But we are in that mess right now and our troops are sitting ducks there and they have these weapons and it is widely known that they met in Khartum and that those terrorists are there.

Now it seems to me that we do one of two things. We either increase our position there and go in and get the job done and come home, maybe put 40,000 or 50,000 troops in there and take care

of Aideed or we withdraw as quickly as possible protecting our troops.

But to leave them sitting there like we did in Beirut, I think is a step in the wrong direction. Some said earlier, people from DOD said "Well, they are secure."

When I was visiting with the President at the White House, the admiral in charge of this operation said they are secure. I understand that the day they said they would be secure, there were three mortar rounds fired into the exact location where the new troops were going to be billeted.

If our troops are sitting ducks, they are building these bypasses so they don't have to go out and engage the enemy, so to speak. Eventually if the enemy chooses to do so, and that may involve Mr. Aideed or terrorists coming out of Khartum, then we are going to lose a bunch of troops like we did in Beirut.

It seems we have two options, either expand our operation and go in and wipe out these guys and get the job done and come home, or else we get out of there as quickly as possible without troops losing more lives like we did in Beirut.

It really concerns me that we are just going to have them sitting in and building bypasses so they don't have to go out into the population. They are sitting ducks waiting for tragedy to occur. For us to keep them there 30 days, 60 days, 90 days longer doesn't make sense to me.

I would like to point out one more thing in the substitute. It says they are going to get our troops out of there except for a limited number of members of the armed forces sufficient only to protect United States diplomatic facilities and citizens and noncombatant personnel to advise the United Nations Commander in Somalia.

There is nothing in there that specifies how many troops you are talking about. That seems to be a loophole that you can drive a truck through. Are we going to keep another 10,000 people there for that purpose? I think that should be eliminated by the chairman, who is the author of this substitute.

In any event, I won't prolong the discussion. It seems to me we have two choices: Go there and expand the operation and do the job, which I don't believe the American people support right now, or get out of there as quickly as possible and turn this over to the United Nations.

This mess would never have occurred, in my opinion, if after we fed the hungry masses back in March and April we would have withdrawn. We wouldn't have lost any life. We wouldn't be in this situation today. It was poor policy by the administration and now we are suffering the consequences.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just say that when I listen to this debate, I think that perhaps many of us have had a lapse of memory. Back in February, the Senate discussed this. When I hear this talk, it sounds like this is the first time Somalia has ever been debated.

The Senate sent over a resolution that we passed. They passed it February 4, 1993. We took up the discussion on May 25. As a matter of fact, we amended it. It was S. Resolution 45.

Incidentally, for the benefit of our orators, there was a Resolution 814 of the United Nations that talked about the new move from UNITAF to UNISOM 2. So I am shocked that the fact that this has been said, we have never had a debate and that is the reason that the ranking member from the other party is being complimented for bringing this to the floor so we could have our first discussion. Either I have amnesia or I have been in the Senate looking at CNN 2.

It doesn't make sense for us to talk about the fact that there are arms there. Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked if the United States would disarm and the Bush administration said "No. We will not disarm."

As a matter of fact, Mr. Burton and I sent the letter on December 22, 1992, which we cosigned, to Secretary Eagleburger which requested that the United States disarm at that time coming back from a very impressive victory in the Persian Gulf. As a matter of fact, the warring factions were shocked that the United States was not there to disarm them. So we do a review.

The other thing that stands out is that we waited until too late before we even moved in with humanitarian aid. It was in August, a week before the Republican Convention when it was decided to airlift food in, which we should have done a year prior to that.

So I would like to say that I certainly support the amendment by the chairman. I think that as we talk about withdrawing, I haven't heard anyone talk about withdrawing from Korea, where we have been for 40 years. I haven't heard anyone talk about the fact that in the Gaza Strip there have been people under the auspices of multinational organizations since 1950 perhaps, and perhaps the peace accord that was recently signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Israel may not have even come about if it were not for the fact that for 40 years there had been peacekeeping troops in the Gaza Strip.

So I would like to once again support the chairman, reminding us that we do have an all-volunteer Army. We do like to preserve, and we try to keep our personnel out of harm's way, but I think that as I saw on the Today Show the day after the tragedy, there was a young soldier at an Army hospital in Germany who said "I hope to get well. I need to go back. I volunteered for the Army. We have a mission to complete."

So I would like to once again remind us that it was in our national interest. It was mentioned about the oil. We convinced the brutal dictator Barre to come on the United States side against Ethiopia in 1979 and the very weapons that we see riding around Mogadishu were paid for and supplied by U.S. taxpayers for the last 13 years so that we could protect the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea so that oil from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia could pass around the Horn.

So when we talk about no national interest, now there may not be any identifiable national interest but from the height of the cold war for the past 20 years we built the biggest U.S. Embassy of anywhere in Africa in Mogadishu in the mid-1980's.

I have been there three times in the past year, and it would be a mistake to try to bring our troops out by January 31. Perhaps

we will even have an amendment to have them home by Thanksgiving.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So we could get a vote before the bells ring, would it be appropriate to vote on these amendments one after another and conclude the debate by 5:10 p.m.?

Chairman HAMILTON. The Chair only has three speakers left. We are winding down. That is 15 minutes—is there objection?

Mr. GOODLING. Is that just for the debate?

Chairman HAMILTON. We will protect your right to offer the amendment.

Is there objection? The Chair hears none. The debate will conclude at 10 minutes after 5.

Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH. I have spoken and——

Chairman HAMILTON. I am sorry—Mr. Levy.

Mr. LEVY. Mr. Chairman, I don't have a statement. I do have a question of the gentleman from the administration, the gentleman from DOD.

Sir, a couple of minutes ago in response to the question from the chairman you discussed the importance of an orderly withdrawal and the question was asked whether we are placing American troops at risk by departing too rapidly. I am not sure that I understood the response. It seems to me that it strains credibility to suggest that we are placing American servicemen more at risk by having them depart from Somalia by January 31 than we would be placing them at risk by leaving them in Somalia until March 31.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. What I said was that any time you accelerate a withdrawal plan beyond which my military colleagues, and this is what my colleagues tell me, think is prudent and doable, when you accelerate a withdrawal plan like that it becomes much more difficult to implement and raises the risk. I think any military officer would tell you that.

We have a sound withdrawal plan that we are putting together based on the 31 March withdrawal date. That is not to say that we are not withdrawing troops sooner. We are withdrawing some troops before the end of the year.

Mr. LEVY. Getting back to my question, I guess the heart of the matter is I am wondering what your colleagues would say in response. Would we be more likely to suffer casualties, people becoming hurt or killed under a scenario in which we removed our troops by January 31 or a scenario in which we left them in Somalia in harm's way until March 31? That is really the question.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. The troops on the ground right now are in harm's way. There is always the risk of casualties. That is what we are trying to prevent.

Mr. LEVY. In which scenario would you guess is the risk greater?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I am not sure I understand the question.

Mr. LEVY. Are we more likely to lose personnel or have personnel killed by taking them out by January 31 or leaving them there——

Mr. LONGSTRETH. They are at risk right now on the ground. We are trying to reduce that risk by protecting them there. During the period that you suggest from 31 January to 31 March, obviously they would be at risk.

Mr. LEVY. The illusion is sought to be created by some people here that we increase the risk and place them more at risk by taking them out than by leaving them there.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. My point is that there is a risk associated with accelerating that withdrawal plan that I think is not inconsequential.

Mr. LEVY. But not as large a risk as leaving people there.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Congressman, I am not sure how we would measure risk in either case, but I see your point.

Mr. LEVY. Thank you very much.

Chairman HAMILTON. Ms. Snowe.

Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Very briefly, members of the committee, I think that we have heard many of the arguments here today and why we are supporting Mr. Gilman's resolution, and I want to add my voice of support to that resolution.

I certainly supported his resolution last spring that required the withdrawal of our troops 6 months from the date of enactment of that resolution. That should have occurred because Operation Restore Hope in Somalia was a successful multinational effort, but that mission changed as we know to operation capture Aideed. We do have a right to ask questions as members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Many are suggesting here today that we are micromanaging foreign policy, that we are trying to undercut the President of the United States. I suggest that many of us as Republicans often questioned our Republican President with respect to problems with their foreign policy and so too should we demand the same answers to the questions that we are asking of the President and the administration today.

We have a right to ask those questions because 18 people died in Somalia. Two happened to be from my district. We have a right to ask those questions because our people were ambushed and surrounded and were not able to defend and protect themselves.

We have a right to ask those questions because the Pentagon denied a request from their field commander for armored tanks. We have a right to ask those questions because the President of the United States by virtue of his own admission said that he was not aware that the mission had changed from a humanitarian one to capturing Aideed. So, yes, we do have an obligation and a responsibility.

I haven't heard anything here to suggest that there is something magical about March 31. We talked about an orderly withdrawal. We talked about backbone of our foreign policy, but I see nothing in this article that appeared in the *Washington Post* on November 1st to suggest that we have any backbone in our foreign policy. Let me quote a couple of lines from this article.

First it says, "The U.S. decision to dig in rather than move out also has affected the policy of multinational U.N. peacekeeping troops. These troops were supposed to serve as the frontline of forces of security in Mogadishu with the American soldiers standing by for emergencies. But the arrival of the American reinforcements has done little to boost the confidence of their United Na-

tions partners, who remain largely confined to 11 United Nations strong holds around the city.

"The American retreat from the streets has been accompanied by a rise in thievery and factional violence which has begun to interfere with humanitarian relief work here. Last week the port was virtually shutdown for 3 days after Somalis in south Mogadishu prevented arrivals from the northern half of the city from reporting to their jobs as dock workers," port officials said.

Though our primary mission was to provide relief and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance, that isn't being accomplished. Now some suggest we really don't have any vital interest in Somalia. Our vital interest is to return thousands of American troops. We have succeeded in the humanitarian mission months and months ago and now we should return our American troops.

Thank you.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank my colleagues for their very eloquent discussion of this issue whether it be pro or con. I think the debate is healthy and we are seeking to bring this debate to the floor of the House so that we can all be satisfied as to whether or not we are doing the correct thing in Somalia.

I ask my colleagues to bear in mind the questionable vacillating Somalia strategy that we have had. There has been an evolution of our mission there. First it was a humanitarian effort and we were very successful in that effort and we concluded that effort some time during the spring of this year. Then it became nation-building that the United Nations had requested us to do, to help build a new government there, and we went along with that. But suddenly the United Nations changed the mission to a manhunt for Warlord Aideed after some of the Pakistani troops were killed, and now we have a further evolution to have our goal as security for our forces.

I say that we don't have a stated and a logical goal in Somalia and to keep our troops there with this vacillating foreign policy leaves a great deal to be desired.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot agree with the arguments set forth by your submission and by the other members in support of the substitute. The reason I am pursuing this course of action is to make certain that this committee and the House has a responsibility to speak out on a very important issue of deployment of our troops overseas.

I submit it should not be considered humiliating or irresponsible for the House to consider such an important matter. To the contrary, I think it demeans this body to suggest that we do not have the right nor the responsibility to debate such an important issue as the further deployment of our armed forces in Somalia.

Furthermore, I take pause and I resent the contentions that any resolution of this nature is an attempt to humiliate the President. To the contrary; what we are seeking to do is to attempt to save not only the President, but more importantly our men and women in the field from another debacle such as occurred with our Rangers last month.

By keeping our forces in place until March 31, that is exactly what we are doing, placing them at risk.

Mr. Chairman, the question before us is not whether a vote for a January 31 withdrawal signals a retreat of our Nation's resolve to the world. The question is whether we are willing to place the lives of American service personnel at risk for 60 additional days on behalf of a foreign policy that our administration concedes has been a failed one.

In essence, the chairman's substitute bids us to vote and to hold our breath for 60 days in hopes that we will suffer no further casualties. I submit to my colleagues that that is not a good enough reason. I say it is time to bring our troops home and I urge my colleagues to go on record urging an early withdrawal by January 31.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First let me say how much I respect and enjoy working with the Ranking Republican Member and have had the pleasure of doing so over so many years, but I am a bit puzzled.

Mr. Gilman claims as he just has that he both resents and rejects any implication that he is motivated in any way by a desire to embarrass the President of the United States. I have been studying the record on this issue and I am just reading from September 22, 1983, which is the year that I came to Congress, and there was debate raging at the time about Lebanon and, there is in the report over here a statement by Mr. Gilman.

I believe that there was an administration of a different political party in office at the time, not that that should have anything to do with this, but at that time there was an amendment being debated about the continued funding for U.S. forces in Lebanon.

Mr. Gilman at that time made a statement, which I will quote extensively from, in which he said this could set an undesirable precedent. We were talking about an 18-month period there, not just 60 days, and Mr. Gilman very wisely looked at the issue at that time and he says, I ask the gentleman from New York, and I believe he was talking to our colleague Mr. Weiss at that point, who had a different view, to consider that the premise then was an 18-month period, we may, and I am quoting, "be in a peaceful situation where we are there only as a policing force and not involved in any imminent hostility which would require any further imposition of the War Powers Act."

Mr. Gilman continued and said "It is for that reason that we should consider that alternative could exist and there would not be the need for an immediate cutoff of any authorizing funding."

You then said, "I think we must consider what happens when we are involved in a peacekeeping multilateral situation without any imminent hostility and whether or not we need to impose a war power restriction of that kind in that situation."

I don't know what circumstances have changed between that time and this, with the exception of the administration, which is of a different party.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. ACKERMAN. You were right then, Mr. Gilman, and I happened to have agreed with you and voted with you in support of

that President and the placement of U.S. troops at that time. I believe you were right and I stuck with the President who happened to have been of your party and I believe you are wrong now and I can't think of too many other circumstances, other than the party of the President, that have changed.

Mr. BURTON. Will the gentleman yield?

Chairman HAMILTON. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. GILMAN. Since my name was used in the quote, I would like to respond. The situation has critically changed since that time and the major difference between the Lebanon approach and the present Somalia approach is that we had a credible foreign policy at that time.

Chairman HAMILTON. Debate closes at 10 minutes after 5.

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, my generation grew up with two lessons. The first was the invasion of the land which taught us that risk aversion didn't always lead to a reduction in casualties; and the second lesson was the Vietnam war, where we learned that just sticking to it didn't always work either.

In this situation, the risk aversion I believe is the more dangerous course. What appears to be at first blush an attempt to secure American lives will debilitate American policy. The risk is here.

Let's not kid ourselves. Every member of this committee that casts a vote today is placing at risk American lives stationed in Africa where almost 350,000 people have died already. If we pull out you can be certain that a large number of those that we saved will die, but you also can be certain it will be almost impossible for the United States to lead any kind of peace efforts in the Middle East, in Bosnia, in former Soviet Republics; wherever a multinational presence is demanded.

We have had a hard time in Bosnia because we found our allies unwilling to join with us to stop the killing. It seems to me arbitrary to put an additional 30 days or 60 days—maybe this committee ought to give the President of the United States the 60 days he says he needs to wind down the policy and not fracture our ability to build coalitions in the future.

I would hope that we would support Chairman Hamilton's alternative, that we would vote down the 30-day withdrawal, the 60-day withdrawal and the 45-day withdrawal if it is offered as well.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Goodling.

THE GOODLING AMENDMENT

Mr. GOODLING. I ask unanimous consent that H. Con Res. 170 be considered as read, printed in the record and open for amendment at any point.

Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection.

Mr. GOODLING. I do that—we had confusion as to when I offer my amendment. I offer that amendment at this time.

Chairman HAMILTON. The clerk will report the Goodling amendment.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Amendment to H. Con. Res. 170 offered by Mr. Goodling. "Page 2 line 4, strike out all the following through the

end of line 5 and insert the following: To begin the removal of United States"——

Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read and printed in the record.

[The amendment follows:]

AMENDMENT TO H. CON. RES. 170 OFFERED BY MR. GOODLING

Page 2, line 4, strike all that follows "President" through the end of line 5 and insert the following:

to begin the removal of United States Armed Forces from Somalia immediately, in a manner providing for the utmost safety of members of the Armed Forces, and to complete such removal not later than 30 days after the date on which this concurrent resolution is adopted by the Congress.

[The title of the resolution should be amended to read as follows: "Concurrent resolution directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from Somalia.".]

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. As I had indicated earlier, my effort is to make sure that we as a committee and as a Congress understand the changes that are taking place in the United Nations as I see it. There are more than a hundred hot spots in this world, and if we use the nation-building argument which the United Nations has now switched to in all 100, we could find our troops serving under United Nations command all over this world.

I really plead with this committee and the Congress to really listen to what is going on in the United Nations and the changes that are taking place, because if we don't it seems to me we are going to find ourselves not in this situation but a dozen like it down the pike. I don't get too excited about my 30 days because I realize we were down to about 2,700 troops I think and in 2 weeks time we were up to 11,000.

Apparently if you can get up to 11,000 in a couple of weeks you can probably get down to zero in the same amount of time. I don't get excited about our troops having to remain because there are already 28,000 other forces there.

How many forces do we need? I understand it will soon be up to 32,000. I offer this amendment so that we think very seriously about how we could be getting dragged into a change of policy, as I see it, in the United Nations, which I think would be very detrimental to our well-being and that of the world.

We cannot build nations. Local nationalities have to do that. We can try to be peacekeepers, but we can't be nation builders.

I yield back the balance of my time.

VOTES

Chairman HAMILTON. Let me explain the votes. We are going to have three votes in a row. The first vote is on the Goodling perfecting amendment to the Gilman resolution. That is the 30-day withdrawal.

The second vote will be on the Hamilton substitute to the Gilman resolution. That is the March 31 date. And the final vote, of course, will be on the Gilman resolution, which is the January 31 date.

The question occurs on the Goodling perfecting amendment.

All those in favor, say aye. Opposed, no.

In the opinion of the Chair the noes have it. The noes have it and the Goodling amendment is defeated.

The question now occurs on the Hamilton amendment in the nature of a substitute to the Gilman resolution.

All those in favor say aye. Opposed, no.

The Chair is in doubt. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Chairman Hamilton.

Chairman HAMILTON. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Berman.

[No response.]

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Johnston.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Oberstar.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Schumer.

Mr. SCHUMER. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Borski.

Mr. BORSKI. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. No.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. No.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Ms. McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Ms. Cantwell.

Ms. CANTWELL. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Fingerhut.

Mr. FINGERHUT. No.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Deutsch.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. Aye.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. McCloskey.
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. SAWYER. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Goodling.
Mr. GOODLING. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Roth.
Mr. ROTH. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Ms. Snowe.
Ms. SNOWE. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Hyde.
Mr. HYDE. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mrs. Meyers.
Mrs. MEYERS. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Levy.
Mr. LEVY. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Manzullo.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. MANZULLO. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. No.

Chairman HAMILTON. The clerk will announce the tally.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. On this vote, there were 22 ayes and 21 noes.

Chairman HAMILTON. The amendment in the nature of a substitute is not agreed to.

The question occurs—is agreed to, excuse me. That is a rather important correction. It is agreed to.

The question now occurs on ordering H. Con. Res. 170, as amended, favorably reported.

All those in favor, say aye. Opposed, no.

The ayes have it and the resolution as amended is favorably reported.

Without objection, the Chair will file the committee report on this resolution by Friday, November 5.

Mr. Gilman.

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Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, in order to preserve our rights under the rules of the House, I must request the customary 3 days for the submission of Minority views.

I would note for the record, however, that we may submit our views at an earlier time if we are able to reach an acceptable understanding with respect to the Rules Committee and floor consideration of the resolution that will permit us a prompt floor vote on the January 31 withdrawal date.

Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection. The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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